Introduction
One of the most persistent criticisms of postcolonialism is that it promotes an antipathy to imperialism that tends to focus on the experience of European colonial empires and neglects other, non-western instances of imperial hubris. The articulation of Islam and empire has not been subject to sustained postcolonial investigation; rather, the relationship between Muslims and imperialism has tended to be represented in terms of Muslim subjugation to European colonial rule. Postcolonial critics have largely avoided the discussion of Islamicate imperialism (Hodgson 1974) . 2 There are good reasons for this. First, the most recent experience of Islamicate communities has been that of being European colonial subjects. By 1900, three out of four Muslims were living in European empires, while there were only four significant polities -the Ottoman domains, Persia, Morocco and Afghanistan -outside of European control (Schulze 2000: 23, 25) . Most of Muslimistan was affected by European colonial rule, and in this respect the Muslim story is not very different from stories of other non-western societies. 3 Islamicate societies share a set of experiences common to what used to be described as the Third World: colonisation, unequal exchanges, institutionalisation of cultural 1 Prof S Sayyid is Director of the International Centre for Muslim and non-Muslim Understanding, University of South Australia. A version of this chapter will be published in Graham Huggan (ed), Oxford handbook of postcolonial studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013. 2 Hodgson (1974: 58) introduced the term 'Islamicate' to refer to social phenomena that were informed by Islam but were not reducible to it. 3 Muslimistan refers to countries 'dominated (either informally or informally) socially and culturally by the Islamicate' (Sayyid 2010: 3) .
inferiority, anti-colonial struggles, formal independence. It is easy to conclude from this that the dominant relationship between Islam and empire has been that of Muslim subjugation. In addition, postcolonial studies has largely been focused on the European colonial enterprise and its remaking of the world; other, prior imperial formations have not been at the forefront of postcolonial analysis.
To put Islam and empire into conversation with the postcolonial is, at best, an ambivalent gesture. Such a conversation can be read as part of the heroically democratising process by which the western canon has become less Eurocentric and more ecumenical; by which marginalised histories have been reclaimed and recovered; and by which the story of the West has come to feature characters who interrupt its privileged whiteness, marking out western plutocracies as intrinsically multicultural and post-racial in an increasingly interconnected world. According to this post-racial narrative, racialised differences in the West have only a cosmetic significance; racism proper is more likely to be located among non-western communities including non-western immigrants to western countries (Sayyid and Hesse 2008) . This narrative often sets up a contrast between Islam and the West as the primary axis structuring contemporary social and cultural relations. The contrast between the imagined benevolence of western imperialism (past and present) and the attributed aridity of Islamicate imperialism restores the legitimacy of the western imperium, building a case for the necessity and desirability of continued American-led military action in the age of the 'war on terror', and institutionalising the series of so-called 'humanitarian interventions' that have taken place in the aftermath of the Cold War (Cooper 2004) . 4 On first reading, Muslims appear to be subjects of European colonialism or -what often amounts to the same thing -to require western regulation and protection; on the second, they appear as potential or actual imperialist heirs of rapacious and predatory empires. In this paper, I want to explore this tension between subaltern and imperial readings of Islam and empire as these are disclosed in a postcolonial context. Currently, the most sustained and elaborate recycling of this image and its associated themes
is found in what can be broadly described as neo-conservatism. 6 Neo-conservatism came to the fore as a project aimed at perpetuating the unipolar moment that followed the collapse of was a lesser evil than Saharan slavery, or that 'Muslim racism' is more racist than western racism). 7 There is, however, good reason to see in the Islamicate empires an imperialism that has its own specificity, and I will recount some of those specific features below.
Imperial Islam
The beginnings and captured the richest provinces of the Roman empire. In purely spatial terms, the territory captured by Muslim armies was approximately 11 million square kilometres, making it twice the size of the previous largest empire (Taagepera 1978) . The speed and the scale of the conquest signalled a dramatic jump in empire-building capacities. Not only did Muslim arms lay low empires that had been around for half a millennium; they did so without necessarily having any significant technological, fiscal or demographic advantage over their enemies. The 'miracle' of Muslim military success has been explained either as divine verdict (either in favour of the Muslims or against their enemies), or in more prosaic terms as the consequence of an implausible demographic explosion in the arid Arabian Peninsula, or as the will to plunder. As Fred McGraw Donner (1981) has argued, however, all these explanations tend to discount the highly organised and disciplined structure of the Muslim conquests, the relative numerical weakness of their armies in relation to those of their opponents, and the absence of any significant superiority in weaponry. The success of the Muslim armies was ideological:
that is, it was based on construction of a Muslim political identity that could not be reduced to an Arab ethnicity or nomadic positionality.
The construction of a distinct Muslim identity is crucial to any understanding of the hundredyear jihad. In the name of Islam, armies were organised, defeats were endured, and victories argue that the semantic order inaugurated by the hundred-year jihad did not subsequently begin to be creolised, or to see in this process of creolisation the recovery of a national essence underlying Islamisation, for example the re-affirmation of a previously subjugated Persian or Indian identity. Rather, the Islamicate empires could be identified, despite all these internal differences and nuances, as those imperial formations in which the articulation of Islam as a master signifier was hegemonic.
Michael Doyle defined empire as 'a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective sovereignty of another political society … Imperialism is simply the process of establishing or maintaining an empire ' (1986: 45) . Thus, the assessment of whether a particular entity is an empire or not turns, like most significant political projects, on the question of identity. To put this differently, an empire implies that the society is not the same as the state. England following the Norman Conquest was an empire to the extent that Norman elites were distinct from the society over which they ruled. The empires produced by the venture of Islam were ones in which (relative to historical precedents and contemporaries) the extractive impulse of imperial rule was tempered by the ever-present possibility of subjugated populations becoming Muslims (Parsons 2010 ).
Racism and citizenship
One of the features of European colonial empires, in contrast to Islamicate enterprises, was that it remained difficult for non-European subjects to become citizens of the empires. As a consequence, European colonial empires tended to be experienced as a form of distant authoritarian rule by the majority of the peoples they governed. The colour line that underwrote colonial order appeared permanent and rigid. Unlike the Roman, Chinese or
Islamicate empires (during most of their iterations) the ability of subjects of European colonial rule to become part of a 'ruling upper class culture' was heavily restricted (Mann 1988: 143) .
The authoritarianism of the colonial order existed despite claims made by imperialists and their supporters that European empires, because of their Enlightenment heritage, were uniquely capable of modernising (i.e. civilising) their non-western subjects. The trouble was that however much the 'natives' were civilised they were never civilised enough to become co- The establishment of race as a regulatory practice based on the hierarchy between Europeanness and non-Europeanness provided the European colonial empires with a political identity that resolved one of the perennial problems confronting empire builders: that of the proconsul who 'goes native' (Mann 1988: 141-143) . In the history of European colonialism, there are very few examples of European governors identifying with their colonial subjects to the extent that they were ready to break their identification with Europeanness. 11 Thus, the development of race erected a barrier to the Caracallan threshold; it meant effectively that the European colonial order was a racist order and that European empires were racial states. The intertwining of the racial state and the modern state was forged in the crucible of the early modern European empires, which came to contain the two distinct spatial entities: the homeland and the conquered lands. Racialised differences came to be deployed as a means of enhancing the solidarity of imperial nations and of preventing their non-European subjugated populations from eroding the privileges of empire (Goldberg and Quayson 2002).
11 There is an argument that the independence movements of the Americas did draw a distinction between themselves and Europe; however, they continued to privilege Europeanness vis-à-vis both the indigenous and enslaved African populations of the western hemisphere.
The Islamicate empires, with due caveats for the cruelty and venality that can be found in all human endeavours, were not structured around a logic of racialisation. This does not mean these empires lacked a privileged elite, nor does it mean there was no humiliation or violation of the subject populations, but it does mean that reading all imperial iterations through the prism of the European colonial enterprise is not particularly helpful. This is not to say that
European colonialism was more vicious or more exploitative than other imperial structuressuch accusations and counter-accusations are generally sterile -simply that empires founded in the wake of Europe's appropriation of the Americas were organised by different logics than previous empires. One of these logics was a deployment of race as the primary ontology of the social. It is important here to have a proper understanding of the empirical 'messiness' of deployment: confusion between philosophers and historians of a certain ilk arises on precisely on this issue. Any generalisation that ranges over 500 years (at least) and covers a number of large political entities (British, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and Russian empires, just to name the most prominent in the story of European colonialism) is bound to be messy.
There will always be evidence of good-natured colonial administrators who were not 'racist'
(whatever that may mean, and it is often unclear what it does mean in such accounts) or who actually loved the indigenous colonial subjects and cared for them, but this does not mean that the logic of racism was absent from European colonial formations. European imperial formations were crucibles of both colonialism and racism. In fact, it would be difficult to separate the two, for racism as a category was coined to describe the practices pioneered by Nazis in Germany in the 1930s in relation to Jews and Roma. The pioneering nature of Nazis in this regard was not in terms of innovative practices, since all these practices had all previously been present in the colonial empires of Britain, France and the Netherlands; rather it was the application of policies of segregation, intimidation and humiliation to populations present within Europe that earned the sobriquet of racism. Thus, the split between racism and colonialism came to echo the split between the West and the non-West. It was this racial logic, as much as the irruption of capitalism, the dawn of modernity and the shift from continental to oceanic power, that was one of the key differences between European colonial empires that emerged in the post-Columbian universe and earlier empires. The Islamicate empires shared a series of overlapping features with other pre-modern imperial structures.
The articulation of Islam and empire was a historical relationship, not an essential or necessary one. As such, it is not straightforward to read from the experience of European colonial empires and Islamicate empires.
Islam and the postcolonial
One Living in the time of the 'war on terror' -a war whose continuity is marked not only by its persistence beyond the governments that initiated it, but also by its banal institutionalisation in the international system -it is possible to discern the contours of empire represented not so much in terms of an opposition to the multitude, but rather as an opposition to terror. This terror is incarnated in the bodies of Muslims, whose very appearance (both in terms of what they look like and that they are present) becomes problematic. potential terrorists in relation to how Muslim they look, are simply outward symptoms of a deeper unease, which cannot be simply reduced to the tangle of geopolitical, cultural and epistemological factors that frame Muslims. At heart of this war against terror is neither a simple struggle against rogue states or violent extremists but rather it is an attempt to erase the contingency of the western enterprise. The European colonial empires were central to the process by which western cultural practices became hegemonic in the world. The appeal of the West, its centrality in the world, were products not of its intrinsic qualities (e.g. claims of prosperity, democracy and stability) but rather of its power over other empires. The world we In between these tensions a promise of a decolonial future glimmers.
